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Copyright law must strike a delicate balance between the long-term need to encourage 
innovation against the short-term use of work already created (Plant 1934; Nordhaus 
1969).
1   This balance depends on the extent to which stronger copyright protection 
actually stimulates creative activity, which in turn depends on two effects.  One is the 
impact of copyright on the income of authors of books, movies, music, software, and 
other creative work.   The other is the effect of the economic incentive in stimulating 
more creative activity. 
  Debate on these issues ranges from scholarly arguments that the extent of 
copyright is excessive (Lessig 2001; Boldrin and Levine 2002) to industry calls for 
expanding the length and scope of copyright.  The debate, however, has not been 
much informed by empirical research, other than fragmentary evidence that the United 
States’ 1891 extension of copyright law to foreigners had little impact on American and 
English authors (Plant 1934; Khan 2001), and that British composers and musicians 
receive minimal royalty income (Towse 2000). 
  In this paper, we investigate the impact of economic incentives on the 
international supply of big-screen movies.  More particularly, we also study the impact 
of a 1998 increase in the term of copyright on U.S. movie production.  
I. Setting 
The demand and supply of motion pictures, on a national basis, can be characterized by 
the following structural equations: 
  QD = a0 + a1P + a2VTR + a3TV + a4PDI + a5POP + ε , (1) 
  QS = b0 + b1P + u , (2)   2 
where QD and QS denote the quantities of movies demanded and supplied respectively, 
P represents the “price” of movies, VTR and TV represents the ownership of videotape 
recorders and televisions respectively, and PDI and POP denote personal disposable 
income and population respectively.  
  Regarding (1), the demand for movies is elastic (Blackstone and Bowman 1999), 
hence a1 < 0.  Since many households “consume” movies as pre-recorded videotapes, 
we expect a2 > 0. The impact of TV ownership on the demand for movies is more 
complicated.  People also “consume” movies through cable and free-to-the-air television 
channels.  However, television programs compete with movie theaters for consumers’ 
leisure time.  Accordingly, a3 might be positive or negative.  As for the effects of income 
and population, we expect a4 > 0 and a5 > 0.  Regarding the supply equation, we 
expect b1 ≥ 0. 
In movie market equilibrium, QD = QS.  Since movies are distributed in diverse 
ways, including cinema exhibition, cable and free-to-the-air television broadcast, and 
pre-recorded videotapes, the “price” of movies is rather nebulous.  Hence, we use (2) 




































1   (3) 
  In the empirical work, we estimate (3) and investigate two questions. The first 
relates to the impact of economic incentives on the supply of creative work.  We 
examine this indirectly by investigating how the ownership of videotape recorders and 
personal income affect movie production.
2   If the movie supply is completely inelastic, 
b1 = 0, all the coefficients in (3), except the constant and random error, would be close 
to zero.  By contrast, if we find empirically that the coefficients a2,…,a5 are significantly 
different from zero, then we can infer that b1 > 0, and that movie production does 
respond to economic incentives.   3 
Our second question is the impact of a change in U.S. copyright law in 1998 on 
movie production.  Pursuant to the 1976 Copyright Act, the term of copyright was the 
author’s life plus 50 years.  In 1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act, which extended the term to the author’s life plus 70 years (Goldstein 
(1998), Section 4.7).  We investigate whether this extension of 20 years led to an 
increase in U.S. movie production. 
II. Data 
We obtained information on big-screen movies from the Internet Movie Database 
(IMDB).  The IMDB reports movies and television series by country of production and 
year.  For each of 38 countries, including major movie markets such as Canada, Hong 
Kong, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we counted movies of over 60 
minutes’ length that were not made specifically for television or videotape. 
We collected data on national ownership of videotape recorders and TV sets 
(color and black-and-white), personal disposable income, and population from the 
Global Market Information Database (GMID).   Owing to data limitations, we confined 
our study to 1990-2000.  We compiled a total of 418 observations.  Table 1 reports 
descriptive statistics of the sample. 
  Empirically, the variables TV and POP were highly collinear (correlation 
coefficient = 0.9).  We excluded POP from further analysis as it was also closely related 
to country-level fixed effects that we included to capture systematic unobserved 
national differences in movie demand.   
  Finally, the variable VTR was endogenous to the extent that the availability of 
movies influences the purchase of videotape recorders.  To account for possible 
endogeneity, we used ownership of Hi-Fi stereos and CD players, collected from the 
GMID, as instruments for VTR.    4 
III.  Results 
Table 2 presents regressions of movie production on VTR, TV, and PDI with country 
and year fixed effects, using both ordinary (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
methods. The OLS and 2SLS results were quite similar.  (For brevity, we do not report 
the country and year fixed effects.)  
<Insert Tables 1 and 2 here> 
Referring to (3), since a1 < 0 and b1 ≥ 0, the term (1 – a1/b1) is positive, and 
hence, the estimated coefficients of VTR, TV, and PDI have the same signs as a2, a3, 
and a4 respectively.  Consistent with our a priori expectations, the coefficients of VTR 
and PDI were positive and significant.  These results imply that the supply of movies 
was indeed elastic, and, in particular, sensitive to shifts in demand arising from changes 
in videotape player ownership and personal income. 
In the year 2000, U.S. ownership of videotape players was 85.5 million units and 
1,305 movies were produced.  Based on our empirical estimates, a one percent increase 
in player ownership (0.855 million units) would have been associated with an increase 
in movie production by 11.9—14.7 units or 0.9—1.1 percent.  
The effect of TV ownership was negative and marginally significant, which 
suggests that the substitution between watching television and going to movie theaters 
outweighed the distribution of movies through television and population growth (recall 
that the TV variable was collinear with population).  Finally, movie production was 
subject to secular decline – all the time dummies were negative and significant.  
 
We next addressed the impact of the Sonny Bono Act on U.S. movie production.  We 
estimated (3) using the sub-sample of U.S. data with a linear year trend instead of year 
dummy variables to preserve degrees of freedom.  We added an indicator variable   5 
BONO, which was set to one for years 1999-2000 (after the Act was passed), and zero 
otherwise.  Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the U.S. sample. 
Table 4 reports OLS results.
3 The coefficients of VTR, TV, PDI had the same 
signs as in the international regressions reported in Table 2.  However, standard errors 
were relatively larger, which might be expected with only 11 observations.  
Nevertheless, the coefficients of VTR and PDI were close to significant at the 10% level. 
<Insert Tables 3 and 4 here> 
Comparing the regressions with and without the indicator BONO, the additional 
variable did not improve the model fit and served to inflate the standard errors of the 
various coefficients.  The coefficient of BONO was positive, but by a one-tailed test, we 
rejected the hypothesis that the Sonny Bono Act led to an increase in U.S. movie 
production.  
IV. Concluding Remarks 
We found strong evidence that, at least in the case of movies, the supply of creative 
work did respond to economic incentives.  As for the Sonny Bono Act, it appeared to 
have been a giveaway to owners of existing creative work, while having relatively little 
impact on new creative activity.   
Future work could draw data on registrations of books and sound recordings 
from the U.S. Copyright Office to test the impact of other major changes in U.S. 
copyright law on the supply of creative work.  Two events stand out in recent years.  
The 1976 Copyright Act drastically increased the term of U.S. copyright from 28 years, 
renewable for another 28 years, to the author’s life plus 50 years.   The other major 
event was the Supreme Court’s 1991 Feist decision that telephone directories were not 
protected by copyright.
4  6 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
* School of Computing, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive 2, Singapore 
117543, Singapore; http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~ipng/. 
 
1.  The received wisdom must be modified for creative work that is a building block for 
further creative activity.  In this case, an increase in copyright protection causes a long-
term loss to the extent that it dissuades follow-on innovation or induces follow-on 
innovation to take a more costly path (Gallini and Scotchmer 2001). 
 
2.  In the early years, the movie studios probably did not anticipate the huge 
potential demand for pre-recorded videotapes.  They sought, in the famous Betamax 
case, to enjoin consumer electronics manufacturers from producing and marketing 
videotape recorders (Sony Corporation of America et. al. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., et. al., No. 81-1687, 464 U.S. 417).   However, by 1986, U.S. revenues from 
pre-recorded videotapes exceeded those from theatrical exhibition (Vogel (2001), pp. 
91-92).   
 
3.  For efficiency, we did not apply 2SLS as the sub-sample contained only 11 
observations.    
 
4.  Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).  
   8 
TABLES 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Unit  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Movies   71.823  154.247 
VCR  Million 6.750  13.087 
TV  Million 20.507  42.300 
Disposable income  10




Table 2.  International Movie Production
a 
Variable OLS  2SLS 
VCR   17.1810  *** 
 (3.4992) 
 13.8995  *** 
 (3.0935) 
TV   -0.2179  * 
 (0.1243) 
 -0.2505  * 
 (0.1291) 
PDI   73.1283  ** 
 (31.1901) 
 91.6323  *** 
 (34.9671) 
    
N  418 418 
Adjusted-R
2  0.9708 0.9704 
a Standard errors calculated using White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent covariance matrices in parentheses.  All significance 
levels calculated using two-tailed tests.   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1   9 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics – U.S. Sample 
Variable Unit  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Movies   708.458  227.588 
VCR  Million 59.048  19.767 
TV  Million 88.953  9.522 
Disposable income  10




Table 4.  U.S. Movie Production
a 
Variable Without  BONO With  BONO 
















Year   -522.220  ** 
 (153.759) 
 -500.966  ** 
 (174.900) 
BONO     68.599 
 (177.929) 
N  11 11 
Adjusted-R
2  0.8558 0.8320 
a Standard errors in parentheses.  All significance levels, except 
for BONO, were calculated using two-tailed tests.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
 